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ORIGINAL ARTICLE
The prioritization preferences of  
pan-Canadian Oncology Drug Review  




The pan-Canadian Oncology Drug Review (pcodr) is responsible for making coverage recommendations to provincial 
and territorial drug plans about cancer drugs. Within the pcodr process, small groups of experts (including public 
representatives) consider the characteristics of each drug and make a funding recommendation. It is important to 
understand how the values and preferences of those decision-makers compare with the values and preferences of 
the citizens on whose behalf they are acting.
In the present study, stated preference methods were used to elicit prioritization preferences from a representative 
sample of the Canadian public and a small convenience sample of pcodr committee members. The results suggested 
that neither group sought strictly to maximize quality-adjusted life year (qaly) gains and that they were willing to 
sacrifice some efficiency to prioritize particular patient characteristics. Both groups had a significant aversion to 
prioritizing older patients, patients in good pre-treatment health, and patients in poor post-treatment health. Those 
results are reassuring, in that they suggest that pcodr decision-maker preferences are consistent with those of the 
Canadian public, but they also imply that, like the larger public, decision-makers might value health gains to some 
patients more or less highly than the same gains to others. The implicit nature of pcodr decision criteria means that 
the acceptability or limits of such differential valuations are unclear. Likewise, there is no guidance as to which 
potential equity factors—for example, age, initial severity, and so on—are legitimate and which are not. More explicit 
guidance could improve the consistency and transparency of pcodr recommendations.
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BACKGROUND
The pan-Canadian Oncology Drug Review (pcodr), part 
of the Canadian Agency for Drugs and Technologies in 
Health, is responsible for making coverage recommen-
dations about cancer drugs to provincial and territorial 
drug plans. The pcodr review process is designed “to 
bring consistency and clarity to the assessment of cancer 
drugs” and emphasizes four dimensions of value in their 
decision criteria: clinical benefit, economic evaluations, 
patient-based values, and adoption feasibility1. The pcodr 
guidelines state that there is no weighting scheme for the 
criteria and no threshold that must be met for any single 
element of the review. Rather, decisions should be made 
on the basis of the individual drug, disease, and context1. 
In that regard, the pcodr could be described as taking 
an implicit approach to decision-making. Proponents of 
implicit approaches to decision-making argue that some 
ambiguity is necessary to address the inherent complexity 
of priority-setting, allowing for individual decision-makers 
to exercise appropriate contextual judgment2–4. However, 
advocates of more explicit processes argue that being vague 
or implicit can lead to inconsistency in decision-making 
and has the potential to create an invisible class of “others,” 
who might be victims of injustice or discrimination with-
out knowing it5,6.
Just a handful of jurisdictions—including England, 
Ireland, and Thailand7,8—explicitly define acceptable 
thresholds, usually with respect to efficiency in terms of 
cost per quality-adjusted life-year (qaly) gained. For exam-
ple, the National Institute for Health and Care Excellence 
in England has set an acceptable cost-effectiveness “range” 
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of £20,000 to £30,000 per qaly gained9. Submissions 
below £20,000 are most often accepted; submissions 
greater than £20,000 per qaly must demonstrate other 
aspects of value. Submissions greater than £30,000 per 
qaly are most often rejected. The Institute also organizes 
“citizen’s juries” to identify broad societal values and to 
understand acceptable trade-offs between efficiency 
and various aspects of equity10, although criticisms 
of how well small groups of citizens can represent the 
preferences of society as a whole have been expressed11. 
On t he basis of feedback f rom one such jur y, t he 
National Institute for Health and Care Excellence makes 
an explicit allowance for a higher acceptable threshold 
for life-extending treatments at the end of life12. Again, 
questions about the economic and ethical justifications 
for that policy have been raised13,14, but the presence of 
an explicit policy has the advantage of being transparent 
and stimulating debate.
In making its recommendations, pcodr, like many 
other decision-making bodies, relies on a process of “pro-
cedural objectivity,” whereby societal decision-making 
is delegated to small groups of experts (often including 
members of the lay public) appointed on the basis of their 
knowledge, expertise, and professionalism11,12. In that 
context, pcodr decision-makers can be seen to be acting as 
“agents” on behalf of society, ensuring that limited societal 
resources—in this case, funding for cancer drugs—are 
put to their most valuable uses13. That approach, though, 
concentrates decision-making authority in the hands of a 
relatively small number of experts. Arguably, the respon-
sibility of societal decision-makers is not always to reflect 
what citizens would do, but rather what they ought to do14. 
That is, the knowledge and expertise of the decision-makers 
can in some cases lead to decisions at odds with public 
opinion. However, the allocation of societal resources is, 
even within a putatively objective process, an unavoidably 
subjective issue, and therefore the preferences of decision- 
makers should be broadly consistent with the values and 
preferences of society15.
In light of those issues, understanding how the prefer-
ences of pcodr decision-makers compare with those of the 
Canadian public with respect to the allocation of scarce 
health care resources is of interest. Within that overall ob-
jective, the first aim of the present study was to understand 
the degree to which the allocation choices of respondents 
might be driven by the principles of qaly maximization. 
The qaly maximization framework requires that resources 
be allocated in the way that produces the greatest aggregate 
qaly gain, which combines years of life, quality of life, and 
the total number of beneficiaries into a single summary 
measure of health gains. Critically, the qaly maximization 
framework presumes “distributive neutrality,” or a societal 
indifference to how health gains are distributed between 
various individuals or groups16,17. The qaly maximization 
paradigm is dominant in health care priority-setting and 
has been shown to play an important role in drug review 
processes in the United Kingdom and Australia18,19. The 
qaly maximization framework is also reflected in pcodr’s 
consideration of relative cost-effectiveness, although it is 
important to note that pcodr does not define an acceptable 
cost-effectiveness threshold.
However, recent research has suggested that the qaly 
maximization framework might not be consistent public 
preferences and that the public is not indifferent to how 
health gains are distributed. Rather, there is evidence of a 
willingness to forego some qaly gains so as to distribute 
health gains more fairly or equitably16,20–22. If most respon-
dents to that elicitation did not appear to make allocation 
choices on the basis of strict qaly maximization, the sec-
ond aim of the present work was to compare the degree to 
which pcodr decision-makers and the Canadian public are 
willing to forego efficiency for greater equity. That sacrifice 
is known as an “equity–efficiency trade-off,” and it is based 
on the idea that equity and efficiency are commensurate 
concepts and that more of one can compensate for less of 
the other23. That is, society might be willing to prioritize 
a relatively inefficient program if it were to be associated 
with a fairer or more equitable outcome. The trade-off has 
limits, though, and at some point, a gain in equity is too 
minor to justify the sacrifice in efficiency, or alternatively, 
a gain in efficiency is so great that it justifies some inequity. 
How might the limits of that equity–efficiency trade-off 
then differ between the public and their agents?
METHODS
The preferences of an age- and sex-representative sample of 
the Canadian public and of a convenience sample of pcodr 
committee members were elicited using stated preference 
methods. Those methods ask respondents to make choices 
between hypothetical alternatives, each described in terms 
of sets of attributes and levels. By systematically varying 
the levels of the attributes in a series of tasks, the weight 
that respondents give to various attributes and levels in 
their choices can be inferred24.
This research was approved by the Capital Health 
Research Ethics Board, Halifax, Nova Scotia, and by the 
University of Sheffield Research Ethics Committee, 
Sheffield, United Kingdom. It was funded in part by the 
Canadian Centre for Applied Research in Cancer Control 
and the Capital Health Research Fund, Halifax, Nova Scotia.
Experimental Design
The process of identifying the patient and program attri-
butes used to describe each patient group has been detailed 
elsewhere22. Briefly, the attributes were identified through 
a process of empirical ethics, whereby each attribute had 
to have empirical evidence of public support and had to 
be consistent with some coherent and defensible theory 
of justice25. An empirical filter ensures that the attributes 
are relevant to society; an ethical filter contributes to the 
legitimacy of the attributes and avoids the “moral relativ-
ism” that might result from strictly empirical methods, 
whereby what is morally right or wrong is reduced to social 
consensus or a simple majority26.
A “pearl growing” search strategy was used to iden-
tify patient and program characteristics with empirical 
evidence of societal relevance, building on the references 
and forward citations of a handful of key articles. The 
ethical justification for those characteristics was then 
subjectively assessed on the basis of prominent theories of 
distributive justice, including need, maximization, and 
PRIORITIZATION PREFERENCES OF PCODR MEMBERS AND THE PUBLIC, Skedgel
324 Current Oncology, Vol. 23, No. 5, October 2016 © 2016 Multimed Inc.
egalitarian principles. During the process, patient age, 
severity before or without treatment, final health state 
with or after treatment, and the distribution of health gains 
were judged to have evidence of public support and a 
defensible ethical justification. To distinguish between 
“severity” as proximity to death and as a poor health state, 
that factor was deconstructed into life expectancy without 
treatment and initial health state. Distribution of benefit 
was considered in terms of the number of patients who 
could be treated. Finally, duration of benefit was included 
to facilitate the calculation of qaly gains—despite some 
ambiguity concerning its interpretation in that context.
It is worth noting that a number of attributes included 
in similar elicitations were excluded from the process used 
here. Most notably, prioritization on the basis of a patient’s 
lifestyle or culpability for their illness had empirical sup-
port, but was judged to have little ethical justification, and 
priority on the basis of social role or productivity had a 
utilitarian ethical justification, but little empirical support.
To balance information about the shape of the utility 
function with statistical efficiency, each attribute was 
assigned 3 levels, evenly spaced across plausible ranges, 
to allow for the identification of nonlinear preferences in 
a minimal number of scenarios. The aggregate qaly gain 
was calculated as a function of the other attribute levels and 
included as an additional attribute in each alternative, but 
was excluded from the statistical models to avoid multi-
collinearity with the component attributes.
Given 6 attributes of 3 levels each, 729 (36) scenarios 
were possible. Given that a survey with that many possible 
combinations would be beyond the capacity of any respon-
dent to complete, a fractional factorial experimental design 
was developed in SAS27. The final design consisted of 22 
paired-choice tasks, which were divided into 2 blocks of 
11 tasks each. Each block included a test of dominance or 
nonsatiation, in which one alternative was unambiguously 
better than the others in terms of health gain, and a test 
of consistency, in which respondents were presented with 
the same alternatives seen in an earlier task. Those tests 
were included for descriptive purposes, but were not used 
to exclude “irrational” respondents28.
Data Collection
Two groups were recruited to participate in the elicitation. 
First, individuals associated with the pcodr review process, 
including members of the expert panel and the clinical and 
economic review committees, were invited in targeted 
e-mail messages to participate. Second, an age- and 
sex-representative sample of the Canadian general popu-
lation was drawn from an online survey panel maintained 
by Research Now, a market research firm.
The elicitations were administered over the Inter-
net. Respondents were asked to imagine themselves as a 
decision-maker responsible for allocating a fixed budget 
between two competing health care programs. They were 
told that both programs had the same cost and that the bud-
get was not large enough to fund both of them. To provide 
a uniform context, respondents were told that the groups 
each had some form of cancer; however, specific diagnoses 
were not mentioned, and the alternatives were presented 
simply as program A and program B. Although labelled 
alternatives have the advantage of making hypothetical 
choice tasks more realistic and concrete, respondents 
can also use such labels to infer information that was not 
presented or intended as part of the task. At the extreme, 
respondents might ignore trade-offs between attributes 
and make their choices based on their perceptions of the 
labels alone29.
Participants were randomized to either a discrete- 
choice experiment (dce) or a constant-sum paired compar-
ison (cspc) questionnaire. The dce tasks asked respondents 
to identify the patient group that they would prefer to pri-
oritize in each of a series of paired alternatives. In the cspc 
tasks, the alternatives were presented in the same manner 
as they were in the dce, but respondents were asked to by 
move a slider that allocated budget percentages between 
the two programs. Respondents could allocate 100% of the 
budget to program A or program B, or to some combination 
of the two, including a 50%–50% allocation. Tables i and ii 
show examples of the two tasks.
Analysis
The two groups were compared in terms of the number of 
choices from among the 11 tasks seen by each respondent 
that prioritized the qaly-maximizing alternative. In each 
choice task, one alternative was always associated with a 
greater potential aggregate qaly gain. It was anticipated 
that pcodr decision-makers would be more familiar with 
the principles of qaly maximization and would therefore 
be more likely to make choices on that basis. The number 
of qaly-maximizing choices made by respondents in the 
two groups was compared by permutation t-test, and the 
proportion of respondents in each group who prioritized 
the qaly-maximizing alternative in most of their choices 
(≥6 of 11) was compared by 2-sample z-test of proportions.
To maximize the statistical power of the analysis, given 
the small number of pcodr members who could potentially 
participate, all responses to the cspc questionnaire were 
transformed to discrete choices on the basis of the alterna-
tive that was allocated the greater proportion of the budget. 
Those transformed responses were combined with the dce 
responses into a single dataset. Equal 50%–50% responses 
in the cspc questionnaire were excluded from the analysis, 
because no preference was expressed for either alternative.
Choice responses were modelled using a pooled 
multinomial logit, which presumes that the likelihood of 
an alternative being chosen is proportional to its relative 
attractiveness30. Simply, the more attractive a given alter-
native is relative to the another alternative or alternatives 
in the choice task (that is, the greater its relative utility), the 
more likely it is that a respondent will choose it. From this 
choice model, the strength of the preferences for various 
attribute levels was calculated in terms of compensating 
variation (cv)31,
CVx:LYg = 1 / βLYg [v
0 – v1],
where βLYg is the coefficient of the life-years gained attri-
bute (the constant marginal utility of an additional life-
year gained), and v0 and v1 are the aggregate utility of the 
scenario before and after a change in the level of a specific 
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attribute from x0 to x1, holding all other attributes constant 
at the baseline (middle) level. The cv represents the amount 
of some valued good (known as the “numeraire”—in this 
case, life-years gained) that a respondent would be willing 
to forego to prioritize a particular level of attribute x. A 
negative cv indicates that respondents would be willing 
to give up some potential life-year gains to prioritize the 
new level (x1) over the baseline level (x0). Conversely, a pos-
itive cv indicates that compensation would be needed to 
accept greater priority for x1 over x0—or equivalently, that 
respondents would be willing to forego some life-year gains 
to maintain priority for the baseline level of the attribute. 
The further from zero the cv for a particular level is found, 
the stronger the preference (cv < 0) or the aversion (cv > 0) 
for that level. Note that these life-years would accrue to the 
hypothetical patients in the choice tasks, not the respon-
dents. Confidence intervals were calculated using the delta 
method32. Preferences for a particular attribute level were 
judged to be significantly different between the groups 
if the confidence intervals did not overlap. All statistical 
analyses were performed using the R software application 
(version 2.13.3: The R Foundation, Vienna, Austria).
RESULTS
In total, 21 pcodr members responded to the survey; 11 com-
pleted a dce questionnaire, and 10 completed a cspc. In the 
representative public sample, 656 respondents completed 
a dce questionnaire, and 662 completed a cspc. Table iii 
presents a demographic and socioeconomic comparison 
of the public sample and the overall Canadian population.
Of 231 cspc allocations by the pcodr sample, 13 (5.6%) 
were excluded because of an equal 50%–50% allocation; 
of 14,267 allocations by the public sample, 823 (5.8%) 
were excluded. No pcodr respondents and only 8 public 
respondents (1.3%) equalized cspc allocations in every 
task, suggesting that most respondents did not hold strict 
egalitarian preferences.
Consistency with QALY Maximization
Figure 1 shows the distribution of total qaly maximizing 
choices for each respondent, by group.
On average, pcodr respondents were more likely than 
the public to choose the qaly-maximizing alternative (6.7 vs. 
5.9 of 11 tasks), but the difference did not achieve statistical 
significance (p = 0.08). Most respondents in both groups 
chose the qaly-maximizing alternative in most of their 
choices: 62% of pcodr respondents and 58% of the public 
respondents chose the qaly-maximizing alternative in 6 
or more of their 11 choices (p = 0.83). A notably larger pro-
portion of pcodr respondents chose the qaly- maximizing 
alternative in all or almost all of their choices: 48% of pcodr 
respondents and 23% of the public respondents made 8 or 
more qaly-maximizing choices (p = 0.02).
TABLE I Discrete choice experiment
Variable Program A Program B
Average age of the patients 70 years 40 years
Quality-of-life without/before treatment 9 out of 10 5 out of 10
Quality-of-life with/after treatment 9 out of 10 [no change] 9 out of 10 [4 levels higher]
Life expectancy without/before treatment 10 years 5 years
Gain in life expectancy with treatment 10 additional years 1 additional year
Number of patients that could be treated 5,000 2,500
Total quality-adjusted life years gained 45,000 7,250
 I would prefer to fund Program A     I would prefer to fund Program B
TABLE II Constant-sum paired comparison experiment
Variable Program A Program B
Average age of the patients 70 years 40 years
Quality-of-life without/before treatment 9 out of 10 5 out of 10
Quality-of-life with/after treatment 9 out of 10 [no change] 9 out of 10 [4 levels higher]
Life expectancy without/before treatment 10 years 5 years
Gain in life expectancy with treatment 10 additional years 1 additional year
Number of patients that could be treated 3,600 700
Total quality-adjusted life years gained 32,400 2,030
Share                                        72% |------------------------ < >----------------------------------------------------| 28%                                         Share
of budget                                                                                                                                                                                                    of budget 
to Program A                                                                                                                                                                                         to Program B
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Respondent Preferences by Attribute
Figure 2 illustrates compensating variations by respondent 
groups, attribute, and level. In the figure, preferences for 
the high and low levels of each attribute relative to the 
middle (baseline) level are shown. Points in the top half 
of each figure indicate more-preferred levels, and points 
in the lower half indicate less-preferred levels, relative to 
the middle level.
The cvs in Figure 2 show that public respondents 
were, for example, willing to forego a potential gain of 1.17 
life-years to 40-year-olds so as to prioritize 10-year-olds. 
Conversely, they would require 70-year-olds to gain an ad-
ditional 5.29 life-years to justify priority over 40-year-olds 
(alternatively stated, they would be willing to forego a gain 
of 5.29 life-years to a 70-year-old to prioritize 40-year-old 
individuals). The preference for 10-year-olds over 40-year-
olds was not statistically significant, given that the 95% 
confidence interval includes 1; however, the aversion to 
70-year-olds was significant. The pcodr respondents had 
a similarly significant aversion to elderly beneficiaries and 
were willing to forego a gain of 5.27 life-years to prioritize 
40-year-olds over 70-year-olds.
Overall, the preferences of the pcodr and public 
respondents were observed to closely correspond, with no 
statistically significant differences for any attribute levels. 
Both groups had a significant aversion to prioritizing older 
patients, patients in a good initial health state or those 
who would finish treatment in a poor health state, and 
smaller patient groups. Conversely, a significant prefer-
ence for greater priority was evident for patients in a more 
severe initial health state and for larger patient groups. 
No significant preferences for untreated life expectancy 
in either group was observed.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
The present work addresses the issue of whether the 
Canadian public and pcodr committee members acting 
on behalf of the public are strict health (qaly) maximizers 
or whether they appear willing to forego some degree of 
efficiency so as to prioritize specific patient characteristics. 
That question is important in light of pcodr’s commitment 
to an implicit decision-making framework, which gives 
individual committee members considerable latitude in 
assessing the value of cancer drugs in various patient pop-
ulations. Although that latitude allows decision-makers to 
exercise context-specific judgments, it could also lead to 
recommendations at odds with the values and preferences 
of the broader society they represent.
The question of which decision criteria have the great-
est impact in predicting pcodr decisions is not addressed 
here. Such studies have previously been conducted in the 
United Kingdom and Australia18,19, and a Canadian study 
using publicly-available pcodr data is currently ongoing. 
But whereas studies of the impact of various decision cri-
teria focus on the characteristics of the drugs, including 
clinical benefit, economic factors, patient preferences, and 
adoption feasibility1, the present study explores differences 
TABLE III Demographic and socioeconomic comparisons, Canadian population33 and public sample surveyed
Age group 2012 Canadian population (%) Survey sample [n (%)]
Men Women Men Women No answer
18–24 Years 6 6 62 (5) 79 (6) 0 (0)
25–34 Years 9 9 109 (8) 125 (9) 0 (0)
35–44 Years 9 8 97 (7) 213 (16) 5 (0)
45–54 Years 10 10 113 (9) 117 (9) 3 (0)
55–64 Years 8 8 89 (7) 100 (8) 2 (0)
65–74 Years 5 5 68 (5) 31 (2) 0 (0)
≥75 Years 3 5 32 (2) 71 (5) 0 (0)
No answer — — 0 (0) 0 (0) 2 (0)
Subtotal 49 51 570 (43) 736 (56) 12 (1)
TOTAL 1318
Note: The proportion of the public respondents that had graduated college or university was 35%, identical to the 2006 Canadian census population 
(p=0.98)34; however, the median family income category for the sample ($60,000–$64,999) was lower than the 2010 Canadian median family 
income ($76,950)35. Income and education were not collected from pCODR respondents, but compared with the same attributes for the general 
population, both were likely to be somewhat higher.
FIGURE 1 Distribution of quality-adjusted life-year (QALY)–maximiz-
ing choices per respondent, by group. The proportion of respondents 
in each group by the number of QALY-maximizing choices they made 
over the 11 tasks in each questionnaire.
PRIORITIZATION PREFERENCES OF PCODR MEMBERS AND THE PUBLIC, Skedgel
327Current Oncology, Vol. 23, No. 5, October 2016 © 2016 Multimed Inc.
in the perceived value of health gains to various patients. 
In this sense, drugs with the same clinical and economic 
characteristics might be valued differently because of dif-
ferences in the relative value of health gains to the patients 
they treat. For example, consideration of a patient’s culpa-
bility for their illness was specifically excluded from the 
present analysis, but it is conceivable that society or pcodr 
decision-makers (or both) might view the value of health 
gains differently depending on whether they accrue to a 
heavy smoker with lung cancer or to a child with leukemia.
It is important to acknowledge that the statistical 
power of this analysis is limited by the very small sample 
of decision-makers. That limitation was unavoidable, 
because the centralization of provincial oncology drug 
review processes within pcodr means that the potential 
pool of “decision-makers” in Canada is relatively small. The 
number of responses was further reduced by the exclusion 
of 50%–50% allocations in converting cspc responses to 
discrete choices. That approach would have had the effect 
of excluding more moderate preferences and emphasizing 
the extremes. However, the exclusions did not affect the 
count of qaly-maximizing choices, and the relatively small 
and similar proportions of exclusions among the pcodr 
and public respondents suggests that they should not have 
had a substantive or differential impact on the observed 
preferences of the two groups.
The proportion of all pcodr members represented by 
the respondents to the study’s elicitation is also not clear. 
The pcodr Expert Review Committee currently has 16 
members36, and the clinical and economic review panels 
take on additional members on a per-submission basis. 
Given the relatively small number of pcodr members at 
any one time, it is most likely that the study’s 21 respon-
dents include some mix of current and former members. 
That group is arguably a meaningful proportion of pcodr 
members, although it is not possible to claim that they are 
necessarily a representative sample.
Within the foregoing limitations, the results suggest 
that the preferences of the sampled pcodr respondents are 
not substantively different from those of a representative 
sample of the Canadian general public. The pcodr respon-
dents appeared, on average, only slightly more likely than 
the general public to make their choices on the basis of qaly 
maximization, although a significantly greater proportion 
of the pcodr respondents appeared to be relatively strict 
qaly-maximizers. Both groups were willing to forego some 
potential life year-gains to give greater priority to particular 
patient groups, suggesting a willingness to sacrifice some 
degree of efficiency for greater fairness and equity. That 
finding is reassuring, because it suggests that the prefer-
ences of pcodr decision-makers are consistent with those 
of the larger Canadian public they represent.
Critically, however, the study results also imply that 
health gains to some patients might be valued more or less 
highly than the same gains to other patients. The pcodr 
decision framework does not define the potential equity 
and fairness considerations that are legitimate in funding 
recommendations or how much weight should be given 
to such factors. For example, the results implied that both 
groups would be willing to pay more for health gains accru-
ing to younger patients than for the same gains accruing 
to patients 70 years of age. The acceptability and limits of 
such differential valuations are not addressed in the pcodr 
guidelines. More explicit guidance could improve the con-
sistency and transparency of pcodr recommendations, 
and in turn, public trust in the pcodr decision-making 
process6,37. Such transparency could also stimulate 
constructive debate about societal values pertaining to 
the allocation of public health care resources.
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FIGURE 2 Preferences of the public and of pan-Canadian Oncology 
Drug Review members, by attribute level. The graphs show compensating 
variations (CVs) associated with an upward and downward change in 
the level of each attribute, relative to a baseline state with all attributes 
at their middle level, by respondent group. The y axis is reversed to 
show more-preferred differences above zero and less-preferred 
differences below zero.
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